LitePaper

Purpose & Philosophy

Croilet exists to crowdsource accountability on-chain. The $TP token is designed to reward contributors who identify, document, and submit evidence of malicious blockchain activity.

The “Shit List” is Croilet’s canonical registry of verified malicious addresses—scammers, exploiters, rug-pullers, and repeat bad actors.

Core principle:

Truthful, verifiable reporting should be rewarded. False or malicious reporting should be costly.

Token Overview

• Token Name: Croilet Token
• Symbol: $TP
• Utility:
  • Rewards for successful Shit List nominations
  • Governance participation (voting, quorum weighting)

  
  

Step 1: Nomination Submission

Any wallet may submit a Shit List Nomination by providing:

Malicious Address (target wallet / contract)

Offending Transaction(s)

• On-chain transaction hash(es)
• Chain/network specified

Crime Classification (select one or more):

• Scam,/ Fraud
• Rug Pull
• Exploit / Hack
• Phishing / Impersonation
• Sanctions Evasion

Evidence & Explanation

• Clear narrative linking address → transaction → harm

Reporter Stake

• A fixed amount of 1 $TP must be staked to submit
• This stake is returned only if the nomination succeeds.

• Nomination enters a review window (e.g. 3–7 days)

Step 3: DAO Vote

• DAO votes to either:
  • ✅ Shit List the Address
  • ❌ Reject the Nomination

Reward Mechanics

Successful Nomination (Approved)

If the DAO votes YES:

Rewards Distributed:

Reporter Reward

• Fixed base reward (e.g. 10 $TP)

Staked $TP Returned

• Successful reporter’s stake is returned in full (1 $TP)

Failed Nomination (Rejected)

If the DAO votes NO:

• Reporter stake is:
  • Partially redirected to DAO treasury (0.25 $TP)
  • Partially returned to reporter (0.75 $TP)

If the nomination is DISQUALIFIED from reaching a vote:

• Reporter stake is:
  • Fully redirected to DAO treasury (1 $TP)  

Anti-Abuse & Safety Controls

To prevent weaponization or harassment:

Reporter Risk

• Mandatory $TP stake

DAO Safeguards

• Minimum quorum requirement
• Cooling-off periods for contentious votes
• Optional appeal process with higher stake

Transparency

• All nominations, votes, and evidence remain publicly visible
• Immutable record of:
  • Who reported
  • Why
  • How the DAO voted

Token Supply Allocation

• 24%      — Burnt Liquidity generated ahead of DAO Formation
• 30%      — DAO Treasury & Shit List Reward Pool
• 30%      — Ecosystem Development
• 10%      — Project Development
• 6%        — Emergency / Insurance Fund

The Shit List Reward Pool is algorithmically released over time to ensure long-term sustainability.

Long-Term Incentives

• High-quality reporters build on-chain reputation
• Shit List becomes:
  • A data feed for wallets, bridges, exchanges, and compliance tools

Summary

Croilet aligns incentives so that:

• Bad actors get exposed
• Good reporters get paid
• False accusations are expensive
• Governance remains decentralized

$TP is not just a reward token—it is the economic backbone of on-chain accountability.

 1. Reputation as a Derived Score

Reputation should not be:

• Transferable
• Buyable
• Tradable
• Delegable

Instead, it is a non-transferable, algorithmically derived score tied to a wallet. Think of it as: Reputation = f(History of Verified Contributions) 

2. Inputs That Are Hard to Game

A. Outcome-Based Accuracy (Primary Signal)

Reputation increases only when a user participates in actions that later resolve correctly.

Examples:

• Submitted a nomination → DAO voted YES
• Voted YES → address was later confirmed malicious
• Voted NO → nomination rejected or overturned

Important: Reputation is calculated after resolution, not at submission time. 

B. Symmetric Risk (No Free Prestige)

Every action that can increase reputation must carry downside risk. 

Action                          Upside                         Downside 

Submit nomination    Rep + $TP                    Loss of locked $TP 

Vote                              Rep increase               Rep decrease

This prevents “elite voters” from voting without consequences. 

C. Time-Weighted Consistency

Reputation grows slowly and decays gently.

• Recent correct actions matter more than ancient ones
• Long-term consistent accuracy > one big win

Example:

EffectiveRep = Σ (OutcomeScore × e^(-time / decay_constant))

This prevents early insiders from becoming permanent aristocracy. 

3. What Reputation Is Not Based On

To avoid prejudice and nepotism, explicitly exclude:

• Identity
• Social graph
• Off-chain credentials
• DAO roles or titles
• Who invited whom
• How long the wallet has existed
• Total $TP holdings (handled separately)

Reputation must be blind to who you are. 

4. Hybrid Voting Power Formula

A clean, defensible hybrid model:

Voting Power = sqrt($TP Staked) × log(1 + ReputationScore)

Why this works:

• sqrt($TP) prevents whales from dominating
• log(Reputation) prevents runaway elites
• Both components have diminishing returns
• Zero reputation still allows participation
• Zero stake = no vote

5. Anti-Nepotism Controls

A. No Delegated Reputation

• Reputation cannot be delegated
• Delegated voting only applies to $TP, not rep
• Prevents “guilds” from centralizing trust

B. Correlation & Collusion Detection

Without identity, you can still detect patterns:

• Always voting together
• Always supporting each other’s nominations
• Circular evidence loops

Flagged clusters can:

• Temporarily cap reputation gains
• Require higher stakes
• Trigger audits

This is statistical, not political. 

C. Randomized Jury Subsets (Optional but Powerful)

Instead of all voters voting on all nominations:

• Select a random subset weighted by stake + rep
• Reduces social pressure and coordination

6. Appeals & Reputation Correction

No system is perfect, so reputation must be correctable.

Appeals Mechanism:

• Higher-stake re-vote
• Fresh juror pool
• Reputation adjusted retroactively

This prevents entrenched mistakes from becoming dogma. 

7. Transparency Without Social Signaling

All formulas should be:

• Public
• Deterministic
• Auditable on-chain

But individual rep breakdowns should be:

• Machine-readable
• Not gamified via leaderboards

This avoids status games and popularity contests. 

8. Why This Minimizes Prejudice

This model:

• Never asks who you are
• Never rewards who you know
• Never trusts intent
• Only measures verifiable correctness over time

The DAO doesn’t decide who is reputable.  Reality does. 

 1. Requirement to Stake $TP for Voting

Participation in any Croilet DAO vote—whether for Shit List nominations, appeals, or governance proposals—requires staking $TP.

• Only actively bonded $TP grants voting power
• Unstaked or unbonding $TP confers zero voting rights
• Voting power is calculated at the proposal snapshot block

This ensures all voters have economic exposure to the outcomes they influence. 

2. Bonding Period (14 Days)

When a wallet stakes $TP, it enters a bonding period of 14 days before becoming eligible for voting.

Bonding Rules:

• Bonding begins immediately upon staking
• During bonding:
  • Tokens are locked
  • Tokens do not count toward voting power
  • Tokens may still be unbonded
• After 14 days:
  • Tokens become actively bonded
  • Tokens gain full voting eligibility

  Rationale:

• Prevents last-minute stake-and-vote manipulation
• Encourages long-term alignment with DAO decisions
• Neutral to identity or wallet age

3. Active Bonded State

Once bonded, staked $TP:

• Grants voting power in all eligible votes
• Can be used repeatedly across votes
• Remains bonded until unbonding is initiated

4. Unbonding Rules (Immediate Power Loss, 21-Day Period)

A voter may initiate unbonding at any time.

Unbonding Effects:

• Voting power is immediately invalidated
• Tokens are locked and cannot be transferred
• Tokens do not count toward voting or quorum
• Any votes cast with that stake are voided for future proposals

Unbonding Duration:

• 21-day unbonding period
• Tokens are released only after the period completes
• No voting or staking actions permitted during unbonding

5. Snapshot & Vote Integrity

• Voting power is determined at the snapshot block
• Tokens that are:
  • Bonding → no power
  • Unbonding → no power
• Only actively bonded $TP at snapshot counts

This prevents:

• Vote manipulation mid-proposal
• Strategic unbonding after voting
• “Flash stake” attacks

6. Interaction with Reputation-Weighted Voting

Voting power is calculated using the hybrid model:

Voting Power = sqrt(Bonded $TP) × log(1 + ReputationScore)

Where:

• Bonded $TP = actively bonded tokens only
• Tokens in bonding or unbonding are excluded
• Reputation alone grants no voting power without stake

7. Design Rationale Summary 

Mechanism                                               Purpose

14-day bonding                    Prevents flash governance attacks Immediate power loss on unbond
                                               Prevents vote-then-exit behavior 

21-day unbonding               Maintains accountability window 

Stake-required voting         Aligns influence with economic risk 

Voting in the Croilet DAO requires staking $TP with a 14-day bonding period; unbonding may occur at any time but immediately nullifies voting power and enforces a 21-day lock before funds are released. 

 1. Nomination Lock Requirement

Submitting a Shit List Nomination requires locking 1 $TP.

• The lock occurs at submission time
• Locked $TP is non-transferable while the nomination is active
• The lock functions as a signal of seriousness, not a stake-based      punishment mechanism
• Locked $TP is distinct from bonded voting stake

This mechanism ensures nominations carry minimal but real economic cost without privileging wealth. 

2. Nomination Qualification Review

Before a nomination is eligible for a DAO vote, it must pass an initial validity qualification phase.

A nomination may fail qualification if it:

• Lacks a verifiable on-chain transaction
• Fails to demonstrate a credible malicious act
• Submits irrelevant, fabricated, or incoherent evidence
• Targets an address without a substantiated claim

Failed Qualification Outcome

If a nomination fails to qualify and does not reach the voting phase:

• 100% of the locked 1 $TP is forfeited
• Forfeited $TP is transferred to the DAO treasury
• Nomination is closed with no vote

This strongly discourages spam, harassment, and low-effort submissions. 

3. Voting Phase Outcomes

If a nomination passes qualification, it proceeds to a DAO vote for Shit List election.

A. Vote Does Not Pass

If the nomination reaches the voting phase but fails to achieve approval:

• 25% of the locked $TP is forfeited
• Forfeited portion is transferred to the DAO treasury
• 75% of the locked $TP is returned to the nominator
• No reward is issued

This reflects good-faith participation with imperfect outcomes while still imposing a cost for incorrect nominations. 

B. Vote Passes (Successful Nomination)

If the DAO votes to Shit List the nominated address:

• 100% of the locked $TP is returned
• The nominator receives a reward of 10 $TP
• The malicious address is permanently recorded on the Shit List

This creates a 10:1 upside for accurate, well-supported nominations. 

4. Treasury Flows 

Scenario                          Treasury Receives

Fails qualification            1.0 $TP 

Vote fails                           0.25 $TP 

Vote passes                      0 $TP

All forfeited $TP is routed directly to the DAO treasury to:

• Fund future rewards
• Support DAO operations
• Maintain long-term incentive sustainability

5. Design Rationale

Why Lock Instead of Slash?

• Prevents abuse without punishing voters
• Keeps governance participation low-risk
• Is neutral to reputation, wealth, and identity

Why Partial Loss on Failed Votes?

• Encourages careful nominations
• Acknowledges uncertainty in adversarial environments
• Avoids chilling legitimate reporting

Why a Fixed Reward?

• Predictable incentives
• Removes speculation and lobbying
• Aligns with evidence-based reporting

6. Summary Rule Set

• 1 $TP must be locked to submit a nomination
• Fail qualification → lose 100%
• Fail vote → lose 25%
• Pass vote → lose 0%, gain 10 $TP
• No slashing of bonded voting stake

Shit List nominations require locking 1 $TP, which is fully forfeited if the nomination fails validation, partially forfeited if rejected by vote, and fully returned with a 10 $TP reward if successfully approved. 

1. Non-Retroactive Enforcement Principle

Croilet DAO does not reward retrospective reporting.

Only malicious activity that occurs after the formation of the DAO is eligible for Shit List nomination rewards.

This rule ensures that:

• Rewards are tied to new value creation
• The treasury is not drained by well-documented historical scams
• Incentives align with ongoing network protection, not archival work

2. DAO Genesis Cutoff

At DAO formation, a Genesis Block is defined:

• DAO Genesis Timestamp
• DAO Genesis Block Height (per supported chain)

These values are immutable and publicly verifiable. 

3. Eligibility Requirements for Nominations

To qualify for any reward, a nomination must satisfy all of the following:

1. Offending transaction(s) occurred after DAO Genesis
2. Transaction block height is ≥ Genesis block height
3. Evidence demonstrates the malicious act itself occurred post-genesis
4. The address was not already:
   • Globally flagged prior to genesis, or
   • Listed in the DAO’s pre-seed reference registry

   Failure to meet any condition results in automatic disqualification. 

   
   

4. Treatment of Historical or Known Scams

Historical Scams (Pre-Genesis)

• May be submitted for informational or reference purposes only
• Are not eligible for rewards
• Still require nomination lock (1 $TP)
• Will fail qualification by design
• Locked $TP is forfeited to the treasury

This discourages farming while allowing archival context if the DAO chooses to retain it. 

Ongoing Scams Spanning Genesis

For scams that begin before but continue after DAO formation:

• Only post-genesis malicious transactions are considered
• Rewards apply only if new harm is demonstrated
• Evidence must clearly separate:
  • Pre-genesis activity (context)
  • Post-genesis activity (qualifying event)

This prevents double-counting and ensures fairness. 

5. Known-Scam Exclusion Registry At DAO launch, a Known Scam Reference Registry may be created:

• Contains widely documented scams existing before genesis
• Serves as a qualification filter, not a reward list
• Is immutable or append-only
• Cannot be used to earn rewards

This registry exists purely to:

• Reduce review overhead
• Eliminate ambiguity
• Provide clarity to nominators

6. Qualification Enforcement

During the qualification phase, reviewers must explicitly verify:

• Block timestamp ≥ DAO Genesis
• Transaction hash validity
• Clear causal link to post-genesis harm

If the malicious act is pre-genesis:

• Nomination is rejected
• 100% of locked $TP is forfeited
• No vote is triggered

7. Rationale & Treasury Protection

Why This Is Strict

Without non-retroactivity:

• Early participants could drain the treasury instantly
• Value creation would be disconnected from incentive
• The DAO would reward knowledge, not action

Croilet’s mandate is real-time accountability, not retroactive scoring. 

8. One-Sentence Rule Summary

Shit List nominations are reward-eligible only for malicious on-chain activity that occurs after the Croilet DAO genesis block; all pre-genesis scams are permanently ineligible for rewards. 

9. Governance Integrity Statement

This rule:

• Applies equally to all participants
• Is immune to favoritism
• Cannot be overridden by vote without constitutional amendment

It is a hard boundary, not a guideline.